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Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizonsI
Z. Z. Me´dera, J. Fleschb, R. Peetersa,∗
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bDepartment of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Abstract
This paper lays down conceptual groundwork for optimal choice of a decision maker facing
a finite-state Markov decision problem on an infinite horizon. We distinguish two notions of a
strategy being favored on the limit of horizons, and examine the properties of the emerging binary
relations. After delimiting two senses of optimality, we define a battery of optimal strategy sets
– including the Ramsey-Weiza¨cker overtaking criterion – and analyze their relationships and
existence properties. We also relate to the work on pointwise limits of strategies by Fudenberg
and Levine (1983).
Keywords: optimality, Markov decision problem, overtaking criterion
JEL: C61
1. Introduction and motivation
Some decision problems are clearly limited in time: they only involve decisions and payoffs
until a certain temporal point, having no relevant options and effects for the decision maker
beyond that point. At one extreme, think of choosing the flavor of a scoop of icecream: the
decision is blatantly one-off, and any payoffs from choosing vanilla or chocolate are gained
immediately. Other decisions, however, are potentially infinite, in the sense that utility-changing
decisions might have to be made after arbitrary long times. Here, one can think of choosing the
palette of flavors for an ice-cream company: managers come and go, today’s kids grow old and
die out, but until the company is up and running, the flavor palette will need to be reconsidered.
Each of these decisions will have both immediate and long-term effects.
The horizon of a decision problem is the temporal distance between the time when the deci-
sion maker is confronted with the problem, and the furthest horizon that is payoff-relevant. This
paper starts with an infinite-horizon decision problem. However, even when the horizon is infi-
nite, a decision-maker might still act as if it were finite. There are various possible reasons for the
decision maker acting in such a way: maybe he (wrongly) believes that the decision problem is
actually limited. It could also happen that, due to cognitive limitations, he is unable or unwilling
to calculate with any utility that he gains in periods beyond a certain period. In our example,
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a manager might care only about the short-run profits of the ice-cream company, and postpone
R&D expenditures.
Short-sighted attitudes amount to cutting the decision tree so that it becomes finite. One
alternative is to take into consideration the entire decision tree, including effects arbitrarily far
into the future. If more cognitive resources, right beliefs, or deep commitments – e.g. to an
ancient family business – are available, the full decision problem can be tackled. If we let the
horizon of the decision-maker grow ad infinitum, i.e. we cut off smaller and smaller parts of the
tree, intuition would suggest that decision strategies that are optimal on the full tree can always
be approximated by strategies that are optimal for infinitely many such cuts. However, this is
not always the case, and strategies that are optimal on the complete horizon can be suboptimal
for all finite truncations of the horizon. A third and distinct optimality notion emerges by taking
pointwise limits of strategies optimal on finite horizons.
In investigating the limit properties of decision strategies, the present work provides a sys-
tematic approach towards formulating and comparing optimality criteria such as the Ramsey-
Weizsa¨cker overtaking criterion (von Weizsa¨cker, 1965) or the limit-equilibrium of Fudenberg
and Levine (1983).
Our results provide grounds for optimality refinements. As we will see, it is possible that
a strategy that is optimal on the complete horizon is beaten by another strategy on any finite
horizon. This means that up to any period, the decision maker would be strictly better off in
expectation with the other strategy. In such cases, there might be good intuitive reasons to go with
one strategy rather than the other, albeit they induce the same expected payoff on the complete
horizon.
The next section outlines our model and notation. In Section 3, we define some relations
between strategies, delimiting the strong and weak senses of taking limits of finite horizons.
Section 4 distinguishes two senses of optimality, and analyzes the resulting strategy sets. The
limit of strategies approach of Fudenberg and Levine (1983) is considered in Section 5. Then,
we consider an approach to prove the non-emptiness of one of our optimality refinements, while
the last section provides some concluding remarks.
2. The problem
Our decision maker faces a finite Markov decision problem.
Definition 1. A finite Markov decision problem is given by:
• the set of time periods {1, 2, . . . };
• a finite set of states Ω, with ω1 ∈ Ω as the initial state;
• a finite and nonempty set of pure actions Aω that the decision maker can choose from in
state ω;
• a payoff function uω : Aω → R that assigns a payoff to every action in state ω;
• transition probabilites mω : Aω → ∆(Ω), with mω(ω′|aω) denoting the probability to transit
from state ω to state ω′ when action aω is chosen.
In every period, the decision-maker chooses an action from those available to him. We call a
path of states and actions that the decision maker can go through a “history”.
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Definition 2. A history h has the form h = (ω1, aω1 , . . . , ωt−1, aωt−1 , ωt), with:
• ωi ∈ Ω, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t};
• aωi ∈ Aωi , for i ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1};
• mωi−1 (ωi|aωi−1 ) > 0, for i ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1}.
The length of h or current time at h is denoted by t = t(h). In a similar vein, the function
ω(h) = ωt(h) indicates the current or end state at history h. We use H to refer to the set of all
histories.
Obviously, the well-being of the decision-maker depends not only on his current choice, but
also on his future actions. Thus, the decision maker needs a decision rule that tells him what to
do at any history. Such a decision rule is called a strategy.
Definition 3. A strategy of the decision maker is a function s that assigns to every history h an
action s(h) ∈ Aω(h). The set of all strategies is denoted by S .
We suppose that discounting is exponential, so the expected utility induced by a strategy s on
horizon T ∈ N is:
UT(s) =
∑
h | t(h)≤T
δt(h)−1 uω(h)(s(h)) Ps(h),
where uω(h)(s(h)) is the payoff received from taking the action s(h) at history h, while Ps(h) is the
probability that history h occurs when the decision maker chooses strategy s. The horizon T of
this function is interpreted as the period beyond which the decision maker ignores payoffs. If the
decision maker considers all future payoffs, however far they might be, we say that his horizon
is infinite. The utility induced by s on the infinite horizon is U∞(s) = limT→∞ UT(s).
3. Comparing strategies
We start by defining relations to compare two strategies within S . First, suppose the decision
maker has a finite horizon.
Definition 4. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on a finite horizon T
if it induces a (strictly) higher utility on that horizon. More precisely, we write s <T s′ if
UT(s) ≥ UT(s′). Similarly, we write s T s′ whenever UT(s) > UT(s′).
Next, it is possible that the decision maker considers the complete horizon of infinite length
of the decision problem.
Definition 5. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on the complete horizon
if it induces a (strictly) higher utility on that horizon. More precisely, we write s <CH s′ if
U∞(s) ≥ U∞(s′). Similarly, we write s CH s′ whenever U∞(s) > U∞(s′).
Another alternative is to conceive of the infinite horizon as the limit of finite horizons, as
the parameter T that determines the length of the horizon goes to infinity. This option involves
comparing strategies by their induced expected utility for large enough T . There are, however, at
least two ways for looking at this limiting behavior, in a stronger and in a weaker sense.
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Definition 6. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on the limit of finite hori-
zons in the strong sense (LHS) if it induces a (strictly) higher utility for all horizons T beyond a
certain horizon T ′. More precisely, we write s <LHS s′ if there is a T ′ such that s <T s′ for all
T ≥ T ′. Similarly, we write s LHS s′ whenever there is a T ′ such that s T s′ for all T ≥ T ′.
Definition 7. A strategy s is (strictly) favored over another strategy s′ on the limit of finite hori-
zons in the weak sense (LHW) if, for any horizon T ′, we can find a longer horizon T such that
s induces a (strictly) higher utility on T than s′. More precisely, we write s <LHW s′ if for all T ′
there is a T ≥ T ′ such that s <T s′. Similarly, we write s LHW s′ whenever for all T ′ there is a
T ≥ T ′ such that s T s′.
Note that the latter definition is equivalent to saying that there are infinitely many horizons
on which the first strategy induces a (strictly) higher utility.
Following Ramsey (1928), von Weizsa¨cker (1965) investigates both LHS and LHW, although
in a different setting than ours. Later, the optimal growth literature adopts the stronger version as
the Ramsey-Weizsa¨cker overtaking criterion (Gale, 1967; Brock, 1970; Brock and Haurie, 1976).
Within a game-theoretic framework, Rubinstein (1979) considers an even stronger version of this
relation.
Theorem 1. The relations of<T,<CH,<LHS,<LHW and their strict versions satisfy the properties
given in Tab. 1.
Table 1: Properties of the relations.
< 
T/CH LHS LHW T/CH LHS LHW
Total + – + – – –
Reflexive + + + – – –
Irreflexive – – – + + +
Symmetric – – – – – –
Asymmetric – – – + + –
Antisymmetric – – – + + –
Transitive + + – + + –
“+” indicates that the property necessarily holds.
“–” indicates that the property does not hold in general.
R is: total if xRy or yRx for all x, y;
reflexive if xRx for all x;
irreflexive if xRx for no x;
symmetric if xRy implies yRx;
asymmetric if xRy implies not yRx;
antisymmetric if xRy and yRx imply x = y;
transitive if xRy and yRz imply xRz.
Proof.
The relations <T, <CH, T and CH.
The properties of <T and T simply inherit the properties of the non-strict and strict orders
≥ and > on R, since they are equivalent to single utility comparisons. Similarly, <CH and CH
inherit the properties of ≥ and > on R.
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The relation <LHS.
To verify that <LHS is not total, consider the decision problem in Fig. 1 with  as the initial
state. The two options of the decision maker are going west (strategy s) and going east (s′).
Suppose the discount factor is δ = 0.5. We see that
UT(s) =
{
0 if T = 2k + 1
−(0.5)T if T = 2k
and
UT(s′) =
{
0.5T−1 if T = 2k + 1
−(0.5)T−1 if T = 2k.
This means that whenever T = 2k, then s T s′, but whenever T = 2k+1, then s′ T s. It follows
that neither s <LHS s′ nor s′ <LHS s, therefore <LHS is not total.
Figure 1: The relation <LHS is not total.
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The relation<LHS is reflexive (and not irreflexive), as any strategy is weakly better than itself
on all horizons.
We turn to symmetry: <LHS is not symmetric, asymmetric or antisymmetric. Lack of sym-
metry follows trivially from cases when one strategy generates strictly higher utility on all finite
horizons. Due to its reflexivity, it is not asymmetric. To see that it is not antisymmetric either,
take two different strategies s , s′ that induce the same expected utility on all horizons. For
these, we have s <LHS s′ and s′ <LHS s with s , s′. Thus <LHS is not antisymmetric.
To show that <LHS is transitive, suppose s <LHS s′ and s′ <LHS s′′. This means that there is a
T ′ such that s <T s′ for all T ≥ T ′, and that there is a T ′′ such that s′ <T s′′ for all T ≥ T ′′. Let
T ′′′ = max{T ′,T ′′}. Consequently, s <T s′′ whenever T ≥ T ′′′. It follows that s <LHS s′′.
The relation <LHW.
In contrast with <LHS, the relation <LHW is total. Choosing any s and s′, for any T , either
s <T s′ or s′ <T s. But the set of possible choices for T is infinite. Therefore, s <T s′ for
infinitely many T or s′ <T s for infinitely many T (or possibly, both).
Next, <LHW is reflexive for the same reason as <LHS, and thus not irreflexive.
The symmetry properties of <LHW are also the same as those of <LHS, again for the same
reasons.
Fig. 2 shows a decision problem where <LHW is not transitive. Suppose again that  is the
starting state and the discount factor is δ = 0.5. The decision maker has three options: going
southwest (strategy s), south (s′) or southeast (s′′). The payoffs for these strategies on different
horizons are summarized in Tab. 2. We see that whenever T = 3k, then s <T s′, so s <LHW s′.
Moreover, whenever T = 3k + 2, then s′ <T s′′, so s′ <LHW s′′. But UT(s) < 0 = UT(s′′) for all
T , so there is no T such that s <T s′′. It follows that s is not favored over s′′ according to <LHW,
therefore <LHW is not transitive.
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Figure 2: The relations <LHW and LHW are not transitive.
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Table 2: Utility comparison for Fig. 2.
UT(s) UT(s′) UT(s′′)
T = 3k + 1 −0.5T−1 0 0
T = 3k + 2 −0.5T−1 0.5T−2 0
T = 3k −0.5T−1 −0.5T−2 0
The relation LHS.
By comparing any strategy s to itself, or two distint strategies that generate the same payoffs
on all finite horizons, we can see that LHS is not total.
Contrary to its non-strict version, LHS is irreflexive, since no strategy can strictly beat itself
on any horizon. Therefore, it is also not reflexive.
The case when one strategy yields higher payoff than the other for all horizons shows that
LHS is not symmetric. It is, however, both asymmetric and antisymmetric: if s LHS s′, then
there exists T ′ such that s T s′ for all T ≥ T ′. But then it is not possible that also a T ′′ exists for
which s′ T s for all T ≥ T ′′, since this would imply s T s′ and s′ T s for T ≥ max{T ′,T ′′},
which is impossible.
To show that LHS is transitive, we can use the argument for the transitivity of its non-strict
counterpart, replacing non-strict inequalities with strict ones everywhere.
The relation LHW.
For similar reasons as LHS, the relation LHW is not total.
This relation is irreflexive (and not reflexive), and we can again use the same argument as for
LHW.
The analogy also carries over for non-symmetricity. However, LHW is not asymmetric or
antisymmetric: the example in Fig. 1 shows that it is possible that s T s′ for infinitely many T
and also s′ T s for infinitely many T .
It is easy to see that the example on Fig. 2 also shows the non-transitivity of LHW, since all
of the strategies in Tab. 2 are strictly best on the respective horizons.
4. Optimal strategies
The decision maker is looking for an optimal strategy. However, he might, for any reason,
decide to restrict his choice to a nonempty subset G of the full strategy space S . For example the
decision maker might restrict his attention to stationary strategies.
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Given a relation R on S , a strategy in G can be said to be optimal in two senses. First, a
strategy can be regarded as optimal if no further improvements can be made on it, i.e. if there
is no other strategy in G that is favored to it. One can think of a former definition for being a
world champion in chess, which used to be not being beaten in a championship final – in case of
a tie, the incumbent would keep his title. Formally, a strategy s∗ ∈ G is optimal in G according
to relation R in the “not-beaten” (NB) sense, if there is no other strategy s ∈ G such that sRs∗.
Alternatively, a strategy in G can be said to be optimal if it is favored to all other strategies in
G. Here, one can think of horse races, where in case of a tie bookmakers consider all the horses
in the dead heat as “winners”. Formally, a strategy s∗ ∈ G is optimal according to relation R in
the “beat-all” (BA) sense if s∗Rs for all other strategies s ∈ G.
The orders defined on finite and the complete horizons involve single utility comparison.
Therefore, a strategy is not beaten by the strict order if and only if is favored to every other
strategy according to the weak order. Similarly, a strategy is not beaten by the weak order if and
only if it is favored to every other strategy according to the strict order. Therefore, we have the
following definitions for optimal strategies.
Definition 8. The set of strategies in G that are optimal on horizon T is given by:
GT = {s ∈ Gs| @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ T s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <T s′},
with Gs = G \ {s} here and henceforth.
The set of strategies in G that are uniquely optimal on horizon T is given by:
GT = {s ∈ G| @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <T s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s T s′}.
Definition 9. The set of strategies in G that are optimal on the complete horizon is given by:
GCH = {s ∈ G| @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ CH s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <CH s′}.
The set of strategies in G that are uniquely optimal on the complete horizon is given by:
GCH = {s ∈ G| @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <CH s} = {s ∈ G| ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s CH s′}.
As its name suggests, a uniquely optimal strategy set contains at most one element.
The simple duality of the two senses of optimality fails in the case of the limit of finite horizon
relations, since these are not total (<LHS) or not transitive (<LHW). Thus, we have a total of eight
possible definitions for the concept of “optimal strategy on the limit of finite horizons”:
Definition 10. The sets of strategies s in G that are “not-beaten-optimal” or “beat-all-optimal”
on the limit of finite horizons in the strong or weak sense, according to the respective strict or
non-strict relations, are given by the conditions in Tab. 3:
Table 3: Optimality conditions.
LHS LHW
NB, < @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <LHS s @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <LHW s
NB,  @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ LHS s @s′ ∈ Gs, s′ LHW s
BA, < ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <LHS s′ ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s <LHW s′
BA,  ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s LHS s′ ∀s′ ∈ Gs, s LHW s′
We denote {s ∈ G|@s′ ∈ Gs, s′ <LHS s} by GNB<LHS . The other sets are denoted in a consistent
manner.
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Theorem 2. For any Markov decision problem and G ⊆ S , the different notions of optimality
induce the following relations on the resulting sets of optimal strategies:
GCH ⊆ GNB<LHW = GBALHS
⊆
GNBLHW = G
BA<
LHS ⊆
⊆
GNB<LHS = G
BA
LHW
⊆
GNBLHS = G
BA<
LHW ⊆ GCH.
Proof.
GCH ⊆ GBALHS .
Take s ∈ GCH. Then, U∞(s) > U∞(s′) for all s′ ∈ Gs, hence there exists a T ′(s′) so that for
all subsequent horizons T ≥ T ′(s′), we get UT(s) > UT(s′). Thus, s ∈ GBALHS .
GNB<LHW = G
BA
LHS , G
NB
LHW = G
BA<
LHS , G
NB<
LHS = G
BA
LHW , G
NB
LHS = G
BA<
LHW.
Strategy s is in GNB<LHW if and only if there is no s
′ ∈ Gs such that s′ <T s for infinitely many
T . This is true if and only if UT(s′) ≥ UT(s) for only finitely many T , which is again equivalent
to there being a T ′(s′) such that UT(s) > UT(s′) for all T ≥ T ′(s). The latter condition is the
definition of GBALHS , so indeed G
NB<
LHW = G
BA
LHS . Similarly, the definitions of all the other pairs of
sets are logically equivalent.
GBALHS ⊆ GBA<LHS , GBALHW ⊆ GBA<LHW.
These cases are trivial, since s T s′ implies s <T s′.
GBALHS ⊆ GBALHW.
Choose any s ∈ GBALHS . Thus, for all s′ ∈ G, there is a T ′ such that UT(s) > UT(s′) for all
T ≥ T ′. Obviously then, for all s′ there are infinitely many T ′ for which UT(s) ≥ UT(s′), so we
have s ∈ GBALHW.
GBA<LHS ⊆ GBA<LHW.
This case is analogous to the previous one, by replacing  with <.
GBA<LHW ⊆ GCH.
Fix s ∈ GBA<LHW and s′ ∈ G. Since s <LHW s′ for infinitely many T , U∞(s) = limT→∞ UT(s) ≥
limT→∞ UT(s′) = U∞(s′). Therefore, s ∈ GCH.
We know that whenever G ⊆ S is nonempty and closed for pointwise limits, strategies opti-
mal on the complete horizon exist, i.e. GCH is nonempty (cf. Thm. 3).
The set GNBLHS = G
BA<
LHW contains those strategies that are non-strictly favored to any other strat-
egy on infinitely many horizons. For this reason, we call them “repeatedly” optimal strategies,
and denote the resulting set of strategies by GR. We conjecture that whenever G is nonempty and
closed for pointwise limits, the set of repeatedly optimal strategies is also non-empty. In Section
6 we deal with an attempt to prove the non-emptiness of GR.
Members of the set GNBLHW = G
BA<
LHS are those strategies s for which, for every other strategy
s′, there is a certain horizon – depending on s′ – after which s is non-strictly favored to s′
for all further horizons. This is exactly the set of strategies that von Weizsa¨cker (1965) calls
optimal. Therefore, we call these “overtakingly” optimal strategies, and denote the resulting
set by GOT. Such strategies are not guaranteed to exist. Indeed, for the decision problems in
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Figs. 1 and 2, there are only two, respectively three possible strategies, those defined in Thm.
1. Since s, s′ < S U for the first problem, and s, s′, s′′ < S U for the second problem, there are no
overtakingly optimal strategies in these decision problems for G = S . The seminal paper of von
Weizsa¨cker (1965) remarks – in a different setting – that it might be possible for a strategy to be
repeatedly, but not overtakingly optimal; however, he does not provide an example.
It is easily seen that GNB<LHS = G
BA
LHW can be empty. Think of a decision problem where there
are only two different strategies and they induce the same payoffs over all horizons. Then neither
of them can be called optimal according to this optimality criterion. Due to such instances, this
particular notion is less appealing to us.
One could call the set of strategies in GNB<LHW = G
BA
LHS “strictly overtakingly optimal”. Thus,
we denote them by GOTS. From our previous results, it is obvious that a decision problem might
have no strictly overtakingly optimal strategies. Moreover, if GOTS is nonempty, then it contains
exactly one element.
Fig. 3 illustrates the set inclusion relationships between the various optimality notions defined
in this section.
Figure 3: The different optimality notions.
GCH
GR
GCH
GOTS
GOT G
BA≻
LHW=
GNB<LHS
A solid boundary indicates that the set is (conjectured to be) non-empty.
A dashed or dotted boundary indicates that the set might be empty.
A dotted boundary also indicates that the set contains at most one element.
5. Pointwise limits
We now turn to examine the relationship between the pointwise limits of strategies optimal
on finite horizons examined by Fudenberg and Levine (1983) and our optimality notions.
Definition 11. Suppose s = (si)i∈N is an infinite sequence of strategies. We say that strategy
s ∈ S is a pointwise limit of s if there is an index set I ⊆ N of infinite cardinality so that for every
history h there is an index mh such that s(h) = si(h) for every i ∈ I with i ≥ mh .
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It is easy to provide an iterative method for finding pointwise limits of a sequence of strate-
gies. First, order all histories in a way that shorter histories always precede longer ones. Then, go
throught the histories step by step: at each history, choose any action that is taken by infinitely
many strategies, and eliminate the strategies that do not take this action at that history. After
each step of choice and elimination, the number of remaining strategies will be infinite. Thus the
algorithm will never halt, and at least one pointwise limit will exist for any infinite sequence of
strategies.
For a set of strategies G ⊆ S , denote by GFL the set of all strategies s for which there exists
a sequence s = (sT) with sT ∈ GT for each T ∈ {1, 2, . . . } such that s is a pointwise limit of s.
The following theorem follows from the results of Fudenberg and Levine (1983). Since they use
a game-theoretic approach, and their formalism is somewhat different, we attach a short proof.
Theorem 3. Suppose G ⊆ S is nonempty and closed for pointwise limits. Then, GFL is a
nonempty subset of GCH.
Proof. Since G is nonempty and closed for pointwise limits, the nonemptiness of GFL follows
from the discussion above on the iterative method. We will now show that GFL ⊆ GCH. Take an
arbitrary s ∈ GFL. Then, there exists a sequence (sT)T∈N , with sT ∈ GT for each T ∈ N, and an
infinite index set I ⊆ N such that s is the pointwise limit of the subsequence (sT)T∈I . Let s′ ∈ G.
Because sT ∈ GT, we have UT(sT) ≥ UT(s′) for every T ∈ N. Let R be the maximum of the
absolute values of all payoffs, and for every T ∈ N let
wT =
∞∑
t=T+1
δt−1R =
δT
1 − δR.
Then, UT(sT) ≤ UT′ (sT) + wT′ for every T,T ′ ∈ N with T ′ ≤ T , and UT(s′) ≥ U∞(s′) − wT for
every T ∈ N. Consequently, for every T,T ′ ∈ N with T ′ ≤ T we have
UT′ (sT) ≥ UT(sT) − wT′ ≥ UT(s′) − wT′ ≥ U∞(s′) − wT − wT′ .
For a fixed T ′, taking the limit when T tends to infinity within the set I yields
UT′ (s) ≥ U∞(s′) − wT′ .
Next, taking the limit when T ′ → ∞ yields
U∞(s) ≥ U∞(s′).
Because s′ was arbitrary in G, we have shown that s ∈ GCH.
Remark. A strategy generated through pointwise limits is not necessarily repeatedly optimal,
i.e. GFL is not necessarily a subset of GR, even if G is closed for pointwise limits.
To see this, consider the decision problem in Fig. 4. Suppose that  is the starting state and
the discount factor is δ = 0.5. Let gt be the following strategy for t > 1: go southeast, stay there
until t, go east in that period, then stay there.
First we show that gt is the unique optimal strategy on horizon t. On this horizon, it induces
the payoff sequence (0, . . . , 0, 4) and hence a utility of 4 · 0.5t−1. There are only three types of
alternative strategies to it: taking less time or more time to get the payoff of 4, or going southwest.
Since the payoff of 4 is taken at the last possible moment, any strategy that takes more time will
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Figure 4: Pointwise limit of strategies optimal on finite horizons is dominated on all horizons.
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induce a utility of 0 on horizon t. On the other hand, any strategy that takes less time will end
up with a utility smaller or equal to 0, because of the repeated payoff of −8 on every round after
taking the payoff of 4. Last, going southwest induces a utility of 0.5t−1. Thus gt is uniquely
optimal on horizon t.
Since gt is uniquely optimal on horizon t, it can easily be verified that GFL is a singleton
set, only consisting of the strategy s of going southeast, then staying at that point forever. This
strategy earns 0 on all horizons. However, we have seen that going southwest earns 0.5t−1 on all
finite horizons, therefore s′ LHS s, and s is not repeatedly optimal.
6. Existence of repeatedly optimal strategies
Take G ⊆ S to be non-empty and closed for pointwise limits. A natural attempt to prove
the existence of a repeatedly optimal strategy within G would be by using Zorn’s lemma, which
is equivalent to the axiom of choice. For s, s′ ∈ G, we write sRs′ if and only if either s = s′,
or s LHS s′. It follows from Thm. 1 that relation R is a partial order on G, i.e. R is reflexive,
antisymmetric and transitive. Take a non-empty set G′ ⊆ G. We call G′ a chain in G if R is a total
order on G′. A strategy s ∈ G is called an upper bound for a chain G′ if sRs′ for every s′ ∈ G′.
By Zorn’s lemma, if every chain G′ in G has an upper bound, then there exists a strategy s ∈ G
for which there is no strategy s′ ∈ G such that s′ LHS s. This would mean that s ∈ GNBLHS , i.e. that
s is a repeatedly optimal strategy of G. So we would only have to prove that every chain G′ in G
has an upper bound. The following example demonstrates that this is not easy. In this example,
we first construct a chain of countably infinite cardinality, and subsequently show that the unique
pointwise limit of this chain is not an upper bound.
For the decision problem represented in Fig. 5, the decision maker has the options of going
east (E) or staying in place (S ) in the initial state . By choosing to go east, he first gains a payoff
of 2, and he has a 50/50 chance of either returning to the initial state or moving to the absorbing
state. The behavior-relevant segment of a strategy is represented by a sequence of E-s and S -s:
(aT )T∈N , with aT ∈ {E, S } as the action for the decision maker if he is in state  in period T .
Figure 5: Pointwise limit of a sequence of strategies is dominated by each strategy in the sequence on all horizons.
1 %% 2 ◦ −1zz
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Suppose the discount factor is δ = 0.5. It is easy to see that any strategy is optimal on the
complete horizon, earning an expected utility of 2. Moreover, it can be shown that for any finite
horizon T , the number of E-s in the strategy up to and including T determine the expected utility
up to T , their order being irrelevant. In general, if a strategy s contains k number of E-s up to T ,
then its expected utility up to T is
UT(s) = 2 +
1
2T−1
(
1 − 1
2k−1
)
,
which is increasing in k. Take the following sequence of strategies: s = (sT)T∈N , where
sT = S S . . . S︸   ︷︷   ︸
T−1
EE . . . E︸    ︷︷    ︸
T
S S S S . . .
Fix any horizon T . We then have
s1 ≺T s2 ≺T . . . ≺T sT
for all T greater or equal to 2T − 1. Therefore,
s1 ≺LHS s2 ≺LHS . . . ≺LHS sT.
Obviously, s has a single pointwise limit, namely s = S S S . . . that prescribes staying in 
forever. However, s is not favored to any strategy in the sequence on any horizon, since s ≺T s1
for all T . Thus, the limit strategy, our most natural choice for an upper bound of this chain lacks
the desired property.
7. Discussion
First, it should be noted that our examples concern non-generic decision problems. We do
not regard this as a serious drawback, as many interesting decision problems are non-generic. In
the generic case, all the sets of optimal strategies defined in the previous sections collapse into a
single one.
The existence of repeatedly optimal strategies remains an intriguing open question, although
we conjecture that for subsets of the strategy space closed for pointwise limits, repeatedly optimal
strategies do exist. If the existence of repeatedly optimal strategies can be shown, we have
good reasons to use it as a refinement of optimal strategies on the complete horizon. Namely,
the choice of a repeatedly optimal strategy will guarantee that for infinitely many periods, the
decision maker has reason not to feel any regret over his strategy choice. If an overtakingly
optimal strategy can be found, there is even more reason to rejoice: compared with every other
strategy, any regret for choosing the overtakingly optimal strategy will fully dissipate after just
finitely many periods.
The assumption of exponential discounting can be relaxed for most of our results. We can
use a more general, history-dependent discount function, as long as it is continuous at infinity in
the sense of Fudenberg and Levine (1983).
While our model is presented in a decision-theoretic framework, the game-theoretic exten-
sion of the concepts introduced should be straightforward. Results concerning the relationships
of various strategy sets will carry over, but the existence properties of various strategy sets will
have to be readdressed for games.
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